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Abstract
The philosophy of mechanisms has developed
rapidly during the last 30 years. As mechanisms-based
explanations (MBEs) are often seen as an alternative
to nomological, law-based explanations, MBEs could
be relevant in IS. We begin by offering a short history
of mechanistic philosophy and set out to clarify the
contemporary landscape. We then suggest that
mechanistic models provide an alternative to variance
and process models in IS. Finally, we highlight how
MBEs typically contain deliberate misrepresentations.
Although MBEs have recently been advocated as
critical realist (CR) accounts in IS, idealizations
(deliberate misrepresentations) seem to violate some
fundamental tenets of CR and research method
principles for CR. Idealizations in MBEs, therefore,
may risk being regarded as flawed in IS. If it turns out
that CR cannot account for idealizations, naturalism
can, and it does so without extra-philosophical
baggage.

1. Introduction
In the philosophy of science, it was once widely
assumed that scientific theories are comprised of laws:
“A theory, as the term is actually used, is a set of laws”
[1 p. 125]. The laws of nature were taken to be
empirical and universal, i.e., unrestricted and
exceptionless [2, 3]. Many philosophers argued that
even the most “stable” biological theories, such as
Darwin’s theory of evolution, are too dynamic, and
contain too many exceptions to be called bona fide
laws of nature [4]. What, then, do the life sciences
study, if not laws? Scientists working in these fields
commonly talk about “mechanisms” [5]. Mechanismsbased explanations (MBEs) are not, however, peculiar
to biology and biochemistry. More recently, some
philosophers reported that psychologists commonly
describe mechanisms [6]. As Weiskopf [7] notes:
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“Mechanistic explanation has an impressive track
record of advancing our understanding of
complex…systems.” Others reported that not only
philosophy of biology but also “the philosophy of
science more generally, should be restructured around
the fundamental idea that many scientists organize
their work around the search for mechanisms” [8].
Mechanisms also hold promise for Information
Systems (IS), for several reasons. First, a fundamental
question is, what does the explanatory work in IS? One
traditional answer is: laws. According to this view, IS
models or theories “attempt to articulate a law” [9, p.
iv, emphasis in original]. Alas, the concept of law faces
many difficulties. Traditionally, “the word ‘laws’ has
been reserved for universally applicable, exceptionless
generalizations.” [3, p 371]. We hardly have such laws
in IS. For example, consider ease of use, explaining IT
use. This is not an exceptionless law in the sense of
“all men are mortal”. MBEs offer an alternative to
laws. MBEs, especially in the new mechanistic
philosophy, are often distinguished from law-based
explanations.
Second, IS models are often divided into variance
and process models [10]. Mechanisms seem to allow
and, indeed, to explain alternative ways of modeling.
Against this background, it is not surprising that the
concept of mechanism has been introduced in the IS
literature. Philosophically, mechanisms are conceived
in IS as an interpretive account [11], and as a critical
realist (CR) account [12, 13]. These seminal articles
can be credited for bringing a philosophy of
mechanisms into IS. At the same time, there is a risk
that IS readers may confuse specific philosophical
accounts¾and
specific
characterizations¾of
mechanisms with 1) laws, 2) statistical generalizations
in variance model settings IS, or 3) anything that can
have a causal effect. Moreover, MBEs in IS may also
be unduly limited to answering why-questions.
Our first objective, in this article, is to untangle
these possible confusions by showing that both the
characteristics and the aims of MBEs, in the specific
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accounts of new mechanistic philosophy, are quite
different from laws and statistical studies (variance
models) as they are carried out in IS. Realizing this
opens up new avenues for IS research, which could
otherwise become unacceptable, because they do not
meet existing IS conventions, such as laws, or variance
models or process models.
Our second goal is to stress that MBEs are not only
incomplete representations. They may also contain
deliberate, strategic misrepresentations. However, it
remains debatable how major existing IS philosophical
accounts can deal with the presence of deliberate
misrepresentations in MBEs. Since we cannot examine
all major IS “-isms” here (e.g., positivism and
interpretivism), we focus on CR. We chose CR
because MBEs have recently been advocated as CR
accounts in IS, and IS readers are told that mechanistic
philosophers have “embraced the philosophy of critical
realism” [13]. Our interpretation of some major CR
sources in IS suggests that idealization violates some
CR tenets and research method principles for CR. To
this end, we propose a different, and more promising
naturalist approach. Our naturalist perspective
recognizes
the
centrality¾indeed,
the
indispensability¾of idealization practices across all
the natural and social sciences, IS included. As an
added bonus, naturalism seems to avoid the extraphilosophical baggage of CR, which some scholars
may find problematic or unnecessary.

2. A short (and incomplete) history and
philosophy of mechanisms
As Darden [14 p. 958] noted in 2008: “The new
research program to understand mechanisms [...] has
developed rapidly in the last 10 years.” After 2008, the
understanding of MBEs has continued to develop. This
is important, because the mechanistic movement in
philosophy is sometimes presented, in IS, as a
monolithic block. For example, Markus and Rowe
[13], as well as Mingers and Standings [12, p. 175],
generically refer to Salmon and Machamer et al.’s [15]
mechanistic accounts without discussing some crucial
differences among them. To be clear, this is not a
critique of [12, 13]. However, a reader of [12] and [13]
who is not familiar with the new mechanistic
philosophy may get the misleading impression that
these mechanistic accounts (e.g., Salmon vs.
Machamer et al.) are, for all intents and purposes,
identical. Explaining some differences across different
mechanistic approaches is crucial to understanding
MBEs.

2.1. Laws and mechanisms

Some IS mechanistic accounts [12] refer to Salmon.
As we understand Salmon, the background of his view
relates to the deductive-nomological (D-N) model [16].
Simply put, the D-N model purports to explain an
observation by logically deducing it from laws and
initial conditions. To illustrate, imagine that we
observe a black raven. The observation of a black
raven is called the explanandum, the event to be
explained. The explanandum is explained by deducing
it from an explanans, what explains the explanandum.
Within the D-N model, the explanans is comprised of a
true general law—All ravens are black—and the
appropriate initial conditions: this is a raven.
According to the D-N model, a scientific explanation
answers why questions [16]. (However, the whyquestion thesis is not D-N specific.) An explanans
explains a why explanandum. In other words, given the
explanans, the explanandum is expected nomically
(because it is a law!), and it is not a coincidence [16].
In short, one asks, “Why is this bird black?” The D-N
answer is: “It is a raven, and all ravens are black” [17
p. 339]; i.e., a raven is black, because it is the law that
all ravens are black.
von Wright [18 p. 19] had a concern: “a law stating
the universal concomitance of the two characteristics
raven-hood and blackness” is not an adequate
explanation. This is because “We should like to know
why ravens are black, what it is about them that ‘is
responsible for’ the color which, so we are told, is
characteristic of them all” [18 p. 19]. von Wright’s
“why question” concern is helpful for understanding
Salmon’s [19] causal mechanical model of explanation.
Salmon [20 p. 708] asked, “What does scientific
explanation offer?” His answer was: “mechanisms of
production and propagation.” A mechanism “yields
scientific understanding” [20 p. 708]. For Salmon,
“this is what we seek when we pose explanationseeking why questions” [20 p. 708]. He recognized that
the D-N explanation fails to provide this kind of
understanding. Similarly, Railton [21] regarded D-N
explanations as “incomplete” or “unsatisfactory,”
“unless we can back them up with an account of the
mechanism(s) at work” [21, p. 208]. As Wright and
Bechtel [22] note, Salmon’s causal mechanical model
of explanation focuses on causation, rather than
mechanisms. Specifically, for Salmon [19 p. 121], “[t]o
provide an explanation of a particular event is to
identify the cause and, in many cases at least, to exhibit
the causal relation between this event and the event-tobe-explained.” According to Salmon, explaining a
certain event traces the causal processes (and
interactions) that lead up to this event.
In sum, on our interpretation, Salmon [19, 20] and
Railton [21] linked mechanisms to laws. We return to
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this issue in section 3.2. In the meanwhile, let us ask
how Salmon’s account can be applied in IS. The IS
mechanisms articles we discuss here that cited Salmon
(e.g., [12, 13]) do not discuss (the applicability of)
Salmon’s [19] causal nexus, which is a physical
network (consisting of causal interactions and causal
processes), in IS. Such interaction is causal if it is
capable of transmitting a mark. It is questionable
whether such an approach fits IS. For example, how
does any IS phenomenon meet Salmon’s [19]
definition of mark transmission, or consumed quantity?
Salmon’s idea of physical networks seems largely
irrelevant and inapplicable to IS. One option is to omit
the details of Salmon’s specific concepts, and just
regard mechanisms as “a chain of [a] web of event[s]
leading to [a] particular event” [23 p. S346].

activities” [15 p. 3]. Many other mechanistic accounts
[14, 26] also regarded mechanisms as composed of
entities and activities: “Activities are the things that
entities do... Activities are the causal components of
mechanisms” [26 p. 371]. Darden [14] offered an
"updated" account of [15], where the activity produces
the change.
Machamer et al. [15 p. 3] found the reliance on
“law” in Glennan’s [25] mechanisms accounts
problematic. In life sciences such as biology,
Glennan’s “direct causal laws” cannot capture how
activities operate, and “leave out the productive nature
of activities.”1 As a result, Glennan's 2002 account [23]
omitted laws. Railton’s [21 p. 208] mechanisms also
backed up laws. Thus, it is questionable how this
approach can accommodate mechanisms in IS.

2.2. Deviation from laws

2.5. Mechanistic-based models must idealize

Craver and Tabery [7] reported that the new
mechanical philosophy started with Bechtel and
Richardson [24]. It seems safe to say that Salmon and
Railton were inspired by the weaknesses of the D-N
model, and assumed laws. Many writers in new
mechanical philosophy, in contrast separated
mechanisms from laws. Bechtel and Richardson [24]
viewed mechanisms as machines: “A machine is a
composite of interrelated parts, each performing its
own functions, that are combined in such a way that
each contributes to producing a behavior of the system.
A mechanistic explanation identifies these parts and
their organization, showing how the behavior of the
machine is a consequence of the parts and their
organization.”
Many recent accounts of mechanisms seem to omit
or downplay the “machine” connection (see below).
Glennan [25 p. 54] regards mechanisms as complex
systems: “A mechanism underlying a behavior is a
complex system which produces that behavior by the
interaction of a number of parts according to direct
causal laws.” Later, in 2002, Glennan [23 p. S345]
noted that as in philosophical vernacular “laws must be
exceptionless,” he omitted the laws. Glennan [23]
regarded other recent mechanisms accounts – such as
Bechtel and Richardson [24] and Machamer et al. [15]
– as a complex systems approaches, which Salmon’s
and Railton’s approaches are not, per Glennan [23].

It was once widely believed in the philosophy of
science that scientific theories or models correspond to
real phenomena, and the theories were evaluated
against real-life observations [27]. According to this
once-received view, in the case of the law “all ravens
are black,” raven and black refer to “real world”
features, and the law is tested with observations of
“real” ravens to see if all ravens are black.
Since the early 1980s, it has become common to
note how scientific models misrepresent the assumed
"real" world characteristics [27]. For example, a
(mechanistic) model “deliberately abstracts away from
and idealizes known details for the sake of simplicity
and perspicuity” [28, p. 769]. As a result, in
mechanistic models “the causal relations responsible
for the explanandum [phenomena] are deliberately
misrepresented on a regular basis” [28, p. 764]. Such
idealization,
the
introduction
of
deliberate
misrepresentations, is a necessary practice [28, p. 764].
One, prominent reason is that the real world is too
complex to handle without idealizations:
The cell and its myriad constituents compose an
extremely sophisticated apparatus; a realistic
representation of this plethora of entities and
interactions—assuming that such a “complete”
depiction is even feasible—would make the
description impractical and the explanation
unilluminating. [28, p. 764]

2.3. Activities and entities
Machamer, Darden and Craver focused on
mechanisms as they are used by scientists:
“Mechanisms are composed of both entities (with their
properties) and activities. Activities are the producers
of change. Entities are the things that engage in

1

“Descriptions of mechanisms render the end stage intelligible by
showing how it is produced by bottom out entities and activities. To
explain is not merely to redescribe one regularity as a series of
several. Rather, explanation involves revealing this productive
relation. It is not the regularities that explain but the activities that
sustain the regularities” [15, pp. 21–22].
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3. Mechanisms in IS: Some Clarifications
After our short and partial review of the history and
philosophy of mechanisms, we now discuss several
potential sources of the confusion an IS reader may
face when reading some of the relevant IS literature.

3.1. Why or how questions?
Avgerou [11 p. 400] reported that “[e]explanatory
theory addresses why and how observed
phenomenon[a] occur.” Following Salmon [20] and
Railton [21] (section 2), Mingers and Standings [12]
and Markus and Rowe [13] claim that MBE answer
why questions. “[S]cientific realists embrace the task
of explaining why things happen (…) The name they
give to the hidden connection is mechanism” [13].
According to Mingers and Standings [12, p. 178],
MBEs answer, “Why did Z happen and not something
else?” [12 p. 178]. As we understand them, Mingers
and Standings [12, p. 178], maintain that answering
why questions makes the mechanism causal. However,
some of the mechanisms articles (e.g., Machamer et al.
[15]) cited by Markus and Rowe [13] and Mingers and
Standings [12]) stress that mechanisms, instead,
answer how questions: “[m]echanisms are sought to
explain how a phenomenon comes about or how some
significant process works” [15 p. 1]. As Thagard [29]
explained:
How questions [...] are best answered by specifying
one or more mechanisms understood as organized
entities and activities […] Thus answering a howquestion is not a matter of assembling discrete
arguments that can provide the answer to individual
why-questions, but rather requires specification of a
complex mechanism consisting of many parts and
interconnections. [29 p. 251]
Thagard’s [29] point could be relevant in IS. MBEs
are not restricted to answering why or “why and how”
[11 p. 400] questions. MBEs can also answer howquestions, and, perhaps, other questions too.
Nevertheless, perhaps we should not limit a priori
which type of questions MBEs can answer.

3.2. Mechanisms, laws, or anything that can
have a causal effect
An IS source [12 p. 172] stated that “[i]n fact,
[mechanisms are] anything that can be thought to have
causal effects in the world.” This claim requires
clarification. On the one hand, philosophers have
characterized mechanisms in various, alternative ways.
In 1978, Railton [21 p. 208] (in a paper not cited by

[11]) noted: “An account of the mechanism(s) is a
vague notion.” On the other hand, many mechanistic
philosophers, cited by [12 p. 175], would deny that
mechanisms are anything that can have causal effects.
This is important, because IS readers may learn from a
seminal paper [12] that Salmon and Machamer et al.
[15] held this view. However, for example, per [15 p.
3], “mechanisms are entities and activities organized
such that they are productive of regular changes from
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.”
A critique or endorsement of Machamer et al.’s
[15] account of mechanisms lies beyond our present
purposes. Our point is simply to note some difficulties
in applying their views to IS. For example, they stated
that a “mechanism is the series of activities of entities
that bring about the finish or termination conditions in
a regular way” [15 p. 7]. Elsewhere, they noted, “they
[mechanisms] work always or for the most part in the
same way under the same conditions.” [15 p. 3]. Many
cancer or IS mechanisms do not meet the criterion of
“regular changes,” nor do “they work always or for the
most part in the same way under the same conditions.”
In fact, Bogen [30] suggested omitting the concept
“regular,” because mechanisms can operate at irregular
intervals. In addition, Wright and Bechtel [22 p. 31]
noted that “[w]ith complex feedback loops, the
mechanism can begin to behave in unexpected ways.”
Later, Darden [14], one of the authors of [15], seemed
to agree with this. Darden [14] emphasized the
importance of productivity over regularity.
Nevertheless, we want to highlight that many
mechanisms philosophers (e.g., cited by [12])
characterize mechanisms differently from each other. It
is important to stress (and not to ignore) these
differences. One fundamental difference is that for
Glennan (1996 [25], but not 2002 [23]), Salmon’s [e.g.,
19, 20] and Railton’s [21] mechanisms play a
supplementary role in law-based accounts in one way
or the other. For example, for Railton [21],
mechanisms back up laws. However, for many
prominent “new mechanism” philosophers (e.g.,
Bechtel, Craver, and Darden), the law connection
hardly applies. Consider Craver and Bechtel [31 p.
473], for example: “It is not laws that do the
explanatory work but the account of the operation of
the mechanism.” The point of, e.g., Bechtel, Craver,
and Darden is that MBEs in life sciences and social
sciences do not act as supplements to laws. Instead,
mechanistic explanations are, typically, alternatives to
laws. Making this distinction is important for IS.

3.3. The ontic conception to explanation
Many forms of realism assume an ontic conception
of explanation, where scientific explanations are not
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mental representations, but things in the world. For
example, Craver’s [32 p. 27] view, according to which
MBEs refer to “objective features of the world,” is
ontic. It appears that some of the IS philosophy of
mechanisms also subscribes to some ontic conception.
According to Markus and Rowe [13], “[m]echanisms
are conceptualized as (1) ontologically real, even if
they are unobservable… and (3) able to produce effects
that would not happen otherwise.” Similarly, Mingers
and Standing [12 p. 172] noted, “[i]n fact,
[mechanisms are] anything that can be thought to have
causal effects in the world.” Finally, Avgerou [11 p.
400] observed that “[e]xplanatory theory addresses
why and how observed phenomenon occur.”
We argue that many seminal mechanism accounts
in IS [e.g., 11, 12, 13] have difficulty accounting for
deliberate misrepresentations (idealizations), common
in mechanistic models. Similar to Love and Nathan
[28, p. 764], we see such a misrepresentation as (1)
typical, (2) necessary, and (3) (should be) strategic. IS
views, like the ontic conception, seem to be
incompatible with deliberate misrepresentations,
which, in the words of Love and Nathan [28],
“fictionalizes in the service of simplification.”
Provided that mechanistic models purposefully
misrepresent phenomena, these models do not
represent “objective features,” “ontologically real”
mechanisms or “how observed phenomenon occur,” as
claimed by many seminal IS articles [11, 12, 13].
Consider, Markus and Rowe’s [12] view: “The
position statement for causal mechanism can be
phrased as follows: Causality involves real physical,
psychological, and/or social processes that connect
inputs and outputs under certain conditions” [13].
However, in mechanistic models, the “causal relations
that produce the explanandum are idealized in
mechanistic
diagrams;
their
representation
intentionally ignores known variations in properties
and other components that make an actual difference”
[28, p. 768]. Then, because the mechanistic accounts
are idealized, “they do not show how the mechanism
actually works” [28, p. 768]. If we are correct that the
seminal mechanism philosophy accounts [11, 12, 13]
cannot account for deliberate misrepresentations, this
observation is important for the following reason. If
misrepresentations are not recognized, there is a risk
that they are deemed flaws in MBEs.

3.4. So-called variance models
mechanisms-based explanations

versus

According to Rivard [10 p. ix], “[m]ost theoretical
models that are developed in the IS domain are either
variance or process models.” A variance or process is
based on Mohr [33], as noted by Burton-Jones,

McLean, and Monod [34]. Two questions arise: 1)
What relationships do variance and process have with
mechanistic models? 2) Can mechanistic models offer
something that variance or process cannot? Let us first
look at the so-called variance IS models [34].
A good candidate for a variance model in IS is the
technology acceptance model (TAM) [35]. Davis [35
p. 319] called ease of use and usefulness “fundamental
determinants of user acceptance [of IT].” In these socalled ”variance” models in IS, typically, each
relationship is presented as a statistical hypothesis,
which is tested with statistical techniques. The TAM is
a case in point. This model examines relationships
between independent variables (ease of use and
perceived usefulness) and the dependent variable (e.g.,
IT use or intention to use IT) statistically. Interestingly,
Avgerou [11] provided a “well known example” of the
mechanisms in IS. It “is the explanation of people’s
intention to use IT in terms of their perception of its
usefulness and ease of use” [11 p. 408]. Avgerou [11]
referred to Davis’s [35] TAM.
Does the TAM in Davis’s [35] work offer a
mechanism-based explanation, as implied by Avgerou
[11]? This ultimately depends on how we characterize
mechanisms. Avgerou’s [11] mechanism account also
referred to Machamer et al. [15]. If, by mechanisms,
we have in mind something along the lines of
Machamer et al. [15], or a later commentary [14], then
we suggest that TAM is not a mechanistic account. We
argue that the aim of TAM [35] is to demonstrate a
statistically
significant
relationships
between
independent variables (perceived ease of use and
perceived usefulness) and a dependent variable (e.g.,
IT use). The aim is some kind of statistical explanation,
and statistical generalizations. Recall Machamer et al.
[15 p. 3]: “Mechanisms are entities and activities
organized such that they are productive of regular
changes from start or set-up to finish or termination
conditions.” The focus of the TAM [35] is neither
examining (1) the setup to finish or termination
conditions nor (2) regular changes, not even changes.
An important objective of TAM [35], and this may
apply widely in so-called variance IS models is a
statistical generalization. In other words, the key aim
of the statistical part is generally to demonstrate
statistical generalization, where one “observes a
characteristic of a sample of a population and then
infers that the population itself has that characteristic,
within a margin of error” [36 p. 18]. Generally, the aim
of statistical generalization in IS seems to be different
from examining regularity, still less regular changes.
Darden's [14] follow-up of [15] changed regularity
with productivity. According to Machamer et al. [15],
mechanisms produce the phenomenon: “Giving a
description of mechanism for a phenomenon is to
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explain that phenomena and its production” (p. 3). One
can also question whether such productivity, as
characterized by [14; 15], is a key goal in TAM. For
Davis [35 p. 320], ease of use means “the degree to
which a person believes that using a particular system
would be free of effort.” Davis [35] measured a belief,
rather than explaining what produces the phenomenon
of IT use or how a certain task is carried out. TAM
does not explain at all what system characteristics
constitute “ease of use.” Hence, TAM does not really
explain the production of IT use, or how the task
resulting in IT use is carried out, in terms of Machamer
et al. [15][14].
We highlight three takeaways. (1) The so-called
variance models may not be mechanistic models, if
mechanisms are defined as by [15; 14]. (It is possible,
however, that TAM might meet some other definition
of mechanisms.) This is because a key goal of variance
models, such as TAM, is statistical generalizability,
rather than regularity or productivity. (2) Nevertheless,
the variance models could offer useful information on
the generalizability of some aspects of mechanisms.
We say ”some” aspects, because translating the
mechanisms model to statistical studies tends to
misrepresent the mechanisms. (3) Mechanistic models
allow an examination of complex changes and
reticulated connections, which variance model settings
have difficulty accommodating. Reticulated means that
the connections can dynamically change. Let us
assume that a mechanism has only seven parts (A, B,
C, D, E, F, and G). First, something takes place from A
to B, from B to C, and so on, up to G. However, the
next time things can happen from A to C, and then to
B, and from B to E, and so on. Next, we examine to
what extent process models in IS allow complexity and
reticulated connections.

3.6. Process models and mechanistic models
According to Mohr [33 p. 44], “[l]oosely process
theory is one that tells a little story about how
something comes about”. This sounds somewhat like a
mechanism. However, for Mohr [33], this
characterization of "process" was not satisfactory: “in
order to qualify as a theoretical explanation…, the
manner of storytelling must conform to narrow
specifications” [33 p. 44]. As a result, Mohr [33 p. 44]
gave process theory “a highly specific meaning.”
These “narrow specifications” include that “the basis
of the explanation is probabilistic rearrangement,” “a
processes theory deals with a final cause,” and
“events,” yet “the precursor (X) is a necessary
condition for the outcome” [33 p. 44]. However,
mechanisms (as defined by e.g., [14; 15]) are not
necessarily event based. In addition, it is questionable

whether mechanistic models [e.g., 14; 15] generally
meet the requirements of necessary conditions. For
example, mechanistic models are often idealized, and
seldom complete [28]. They do not necessarily deal
with final causes. With mechanistic models such as
[e.g., 14, 15], the mechanism (and its part, e.g.,
activities) is “the basis of explanation.” Regardless,
with mechanistic models [e.g., 14, 15], Mohr’s [33]
probabilistic rearrangement may not be required. In
short, it can be seen that process models, as defined by
Mohr [33], are importantly different from mechanistic
models (in the sense of what, e.g., [14] or [15] assign
to mechanisms). To be sure, we do not claim that no
mechanistic model can meet Mohr's [33] process. Our
point is that one can imagine MBEs, which do not
qualify as process theories, according to Mohr [33].
Therefore, many of Mohr’s [33] requirements ("narrow
specifications”) for process seem too restrictive, and
seem not to allow reticulated connections.

4. An IS example
misrepresentation

of

deliberate

In this section, we examine an example of MBEs in
IS. The example is a qualitative CR case study by
Henfridsson and Bygstad [37]. We present only part of
the study [37]. The authors [37] proposed three digital
infrastructure mechanisms: innovation, scaling, and
adoption, of which we present two (Fig. 1). We
propose the interpretation that the mechanisms by [37]
are, in fact, idealized. By idealized, we mean that the
mechanisms contain deliberate misrepresentations of
the assumed "real" phenomenon or what explains it. To
be clear, this is not a critique of [37]. Au contraire,
their models are excellent examples of idealization
(deliberate misrepresentations). Henfridsson and
Bygstad [37] follow CR. We then ask: how does CR
account for the deliberate misrepresentations? Asking
this
question
is
important
because,
if
misrepresentations are not recognized, there is a risk
that they are deemed flaws in MBEs. We next discuss
the mechanistic models by [37].
Digital
infrastructure
Technical
malleability

New
services

Recombination

Digital
infrastructure
More service
offered
More
users adopt

More
resources
invested

Figure 1. The mechanisms of innovation and
adoption [37 p. 919].
The authors presented these mechanisms
separately, for analytical reasons [37 p. 918]. In what
follows, we choose to focus on the mechanism of
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adoption, although we maintain that our general point
equally applies to the other two mechanisms. These
mechanisms (Fig 1) are presented as “self-reinforcing”
and recursive, in the sense that each mechanism
“recursively feeds on itself" [37 p. 911].
We propose the following. Contra Henfridsson and
Bygstad [37], the mechanism of adoption is hardly a
“self-reinforcing process” which “recursively feeds on
itself,” at least when these claims are taken at face
value. First, it is not always the case that the more
services are offered, the more users adopt them.
Similarly, it is not always true that “with more users
adopting the infrastructure services, more resources
were allocated to improve and extend the
infrastructure” [37 p. 919]. There are obvious
exceptions. Second, even if we accept, for the sake of
the argument, that the cycle-recursive process takes
place in ”real” settings, it still would not be selfreinforcing and recursive for an infinite period: At
some point, we would run out of users, resources, or
both. Third, more services offered is the starting point
for the adoption mechanisms, and new services are the
outcome of innovation mechanisms [37 p. 918].
Furthermore, “the adoption mechanisms provided the
financial resources to maintain the innovation
mechanisms” [37 p. 918]. What this point shows is that
these mechanisms mutually interact, which, taken
literally, runs contrary to the claim by Henfridsson and
Bygstad [37] that these cycles are individually “selfreinforcing processes” or “recursive.”. Fourth, and
finally, Henfridsson and Bygstad [37 p. 918] referred
to the Internet strategy, which presumably
encompasses various other aspects, in addition to
“more services offered.” To illustrate, it seems
plausible to assume that if the systems were difficult to
use, then users may feel less inclined to use them. But
then, “more services offered” is not the only difference
maker. Service quality, marketing tactics, and
competitors’ offerings can all play a role here,
interacting with more services offered, in the
explanation of use.
In sum, far from being excruciatingly realistic, the
models in Fig. 1 seem to contain idealizations
(deliberate misrepresentations). The authors [37]
themselves seemed to be aware of this to some extent.
They “acknowledge that the granularity of our analysis
of causality is at a relatively high level, suggesting the
existence of nested causal paths in digital infrastructure
evolution left unaddressed in this study. Thus, we do
not claim that we have discovered all of the
mechanisms relevant for infrastructure evolution” [37
p. 928]. We want to advance the interpretation that
they [37] deliberately misrepresented the mechanisms
of adoption.

[37] was published in the MIS Quarterly special
issue on CR, and discussed by [11] as a paradigmatic
CR study. This study, as stated by the authors, “adopts
a critical realist view” [37 p. 907-908, p. 910] in the
sense of Bhaskar. CR “defends a strongly realist
ontology that there is an existing, causally efficacious,
world independent of our knowledge” [38 p. 795]. “CR
recognizes,” Mingers et al. [38] continued, “that our
access to this world is in fact limited and always
mediated by our perceptual and theoretical lenses. It
accepts epistemic relativity (that knowledge is always
local and historical), but not judgmental relativity (that
all viewpoints must be equally valid)” [38, p. 795].
Similarly, the CR case study principles reported that
“scientific research must revolve around the
independent reality that comprises the world, even
though humans are usually unable to fully understand
or observe this reality, and that our knowledge of
reality is fallible” [39 p. 789].
Could CR theses account for the misrepresentations
(Fig. 1)? A full review of CR is beyond the scope of
this paper. Thus, we focus on some CR theses (e.g.,
fallibilism, theory-ladennes, realist ontology) in major
IS sources [11; 38; 39]. First, the fallibilism of
scientific knowledge [38]. The idea that scientific
theories are always revisable, and thus, can never be
shown to be absolutely true, is a popular stance. Thus,
is not CR specific, and it is not about idealizations. We
know that mechanisms of adoption (Fig. 1) are not
known to be true with absolute certainty. Nonetheless,
such mechanism is not currently being rejected or
revised. In addition, theory-ladenness is not unique to
CR per se. It is a well-known feature of science, widely
accepted across many philosophical systems. Theoryladenness is not about deliberate misrepresentations. It
is the idea that observation in science heavily depends
on the theoretical background at play. Idealizations,
however, can be broadly defined as the deliberate
distortion of detail in a model, a sort of fictionalization
in the service of simplification.
This leads to the question of which theses are
germane to CR? One plausible answer is the “strongly
realist ontology” advocated by Mingers et al. [38]. But,
note, the “strong realism” is difficult to reconcile with
the idea of idealization in scientific models. Consider
the following criterion of CR case study principles: CR
“seeks to posit descriptions of reality,” where the
“resulting knowledge claims are focused on specifying
and describing those elements of reality which must
exist in order for the events and experiences under
examination to have occurred” [39 p. 793]. However,
the mechanisms in [37] in Fig. 1 may not accomplish
this requirement, due to idealizations. Moreover, given
the deliberate omission and misrepresentation of detail,
it becomes difficult to maintain that the model depicted
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in Fig. 1 is a “concrete systems that makes it what it is”
[37 p. 911].
Finally, according to CR case study principles [39],
“a proposed mechanism "must survive an empirical
test...where survival is indicated by the observation of
evidence consistent with what the theory predicts" (Lee
and Hubona 2009)” [39 p. 801]. According to CR case
study principles, prediction is commonly replaced with
explanation [39]. Generally, many idealizations have
difficulty meeting the aforementioned empirical test.
Henfridsson and Bygstad’s research question [37] is
“which mechanisms contingently cause the evolution
of digital infrastructure, is partially geared toward
defining what constitutes a digital infrastructure” [37 p.
911]. But these mechanistic models (Fig. 1) hardly
“contingently cause the evolution of digital
infrastructure” [37 p. 911]. We mentioned possible
observations that are inconsistent with what the models
explain (Fig 1). While we are not criticizing the
Henfridsson and Bygstad [37] study, the causality
attributed to CR research by CR methodological
principles is also hard to meet.2
Our takeaway is the following. First, theoryladenness, human biases, and the thesis that scientific
knowledge is fallible are important ideas, but they are
different from and independent of idealizations.
Second, as we understand CR [37, 38] and CR case
study principles [39], they both have difficulty
accounting for idealizations. Furthermore, CR case
study principles seem to ban idealizations: “Ensure
causal factors are not idealizations” [39 p. 802]. We
find this problematic, because virtually all scientific
studies idealize. Failure to understand idealization
leads to more trouble. CR case study principles hold
that “contrary findings would possibly lead to further
explication of events, structure and context, as well as
additional retroduction to identify a mechanism acting
to counter or nullify the proposed explanation” [39 p.
801]. However, this may not happen in the case of
MBEs in scientific practice: “Even when the relevant
details are known, researchers do not replace idealized
causal relations with more accurate or realistic
representations” [28, p. 769]. The point is that “the
gradual elimination of idealized diagrams is rarely—if
ever—witnessed in scientific practice” [28 p. 769].
Given the possible CR problems with idealizations,
2

CR assumes causality in research models “if and only if it is the
case that some event E would not have occurred, under the
conditions that actually prevailed but for (the operation of) X”
(Bhaskar 1998, p. 101)” [39 p. 789]. Consider also, “why did Z
happen and not something else? To answer this we have to examine
the characteristics and properties of the mechanisms that are
involved in the events so that we can explain the particular event as
following from the causal powers of these mechanisms. This is
generative or mechanism causality” [12, p. 178].

what are the other options? One option is naturalism,
which we briefly introduce next.

4.1. Critical realists or naturalists?
Readers of the philosophy of mechanisms in IS [12,
13] may have inferred that various mechanistic
accounts in the philosophy of science are explicitly or
implicitly committed to CR3. However, the extent to
which many of the neo-mechanistic philosophers
mentioned by Markus and Rowe [13] and Mingers and
Standing [12] are actually committed to CR is
questionable, to say the least. For example, Markus and
Rowe [13] cited Hedström and Ylikoski [40] as
evidence that the proponents of mechanisms
“embraced the philosophy of critical realism.”
However, Hedström and Ylikoski [40 pp. 56–57]
offered a critique of CR. For them [40 p. 57], CR
carries “extra philosophical baggage that we may want
to avoid.” [40 p. 57]. They continued that “the
development of critical realism also seems to have
stalled” [40 p. 57]. Later, Ylikoski [41 p. 334] reported
that “critical realism seems to have some worrisome
features.” Thus, on one hand, it is not clear to us what
value CR-specific theses add for the Henfridsson and
Bygstad [37] CR study. (As mentioned, assuming
theory-ladenness and the fallibilism of scientific
knowledge do not require one to commit to CR at all.)
On the other hand, we wonder whether the
idealizations, such as by [37] (cf. Fig 1), violate certain
CR theses and CR case study principles [39]. Although
CR advocates in IS often compare CR with
interpretivism and positivisms [38, 39], there are other
alternatives.
For understanding mechanisms, we argue, it is
important to consult critically how mechanisms are
successfully used in sciences, and build the
philosophizing from there. This approach is often
referred to as practice-based philosophy, or naturalism.
In fact, many contemporary mechanisms philosophers
cited by [12, 13] refer to themselves as ”naturalists” or
”practice-based philosophers” [14, 15, 42, 43]. To be
sure, naturalism is not a homogenous movement [43].
However, an important point shared by many
naturalists is a rejection of the idea of a priori
philosophizing. Thagard [43 p. 249] thought that
“naturalists agree that progress in philosophy requires
close attention to scientific developments”. Bechtel
3

“The causal mechanism concept evolved somewhat independently
in two intellectual communities, scientific realism and sociology,
that appear to be converging under the banner of critical realism
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010)” [13]. Elsewhere, [13] also noted that
“proponents of social mechanisms appear to have embraced the
philosophy of critical realism...as a foundation for their theorizing
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010)” [13].
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[42] said, “[p]hilosophers of science adopting a
naturalistic perspective often present themselves as
investigating the domain of science in the manner in
which scientists investigate phenomena in their own
domains of inquiry” (p. 2). This is, roughly speaking,
what we mean by naturalism. It is an attempt to
understand the mechanisms used by scientists, without
imposing “extra philosophical baggage” [40].
Naturalism does not have to be dogmatic toward
scientific practice. Because naturalism avoids imposing
a priori concepts from philosophy on actual scientific
practice, it allows IS scholars some freedom to propose
MBEs based on the phenomenon they study.

5. Conclusions
Scholars [e.g., 11, 12, 13, 39, 40] have increased
our understanding of mechanisms in IS. We suggested
a distinction between (1) laws, (2) variance models
aimed at statistical explanations and statistical
generalizations, and (3) some mechanistic accounts
[e.g., 14; 15], for the following reasons. Universal laws
do not allow dynamics and change (e.g., reticulated
connections). In addition, variance models may aim for
statistical generalizations. Although useful, variance
models in IS may not be well suited for understanding
a highly dynamic phenomenon. Moreover, statistical
generalizations for IS may not be aimed at showing
“productivity.” In turn, Mohr’s [41] process contained
characteristics that may limit dynamic and reticulated
theorizing. MBEs may help here by allowing the
modeling of a complex and reticulated phenomenon,
for example, with pathway modeling. Furthermore,
mechanistic models are idealized (contain purposeful
misrepresentations) for strategic reasons. Assuming
that IS phenomena are not much more stable and
simpler than biological or economical phenomena,
even the most detailed mechanistic models in IS will
most likely be idealizations, too. If so, “[t]he goal of
[a] mechanistic explanation is not an all-inclusive
single model but a series of many complementary
diagrams and descriptions comprising different
idealizations” [28, p. 772]. Such a multi-model strategy
could also be useful in IS. Mechanistic models tend to
idealize, but idealizations may not be considered part
of standard scientific practice in major accounts of
MBEs in IS. As result, there could be a risk that
idealizations end up criticized as a flaw in IS, and IS
authors may have to claim that idealizations
correspond to the assumed reality. The latter case may
result in some IS scholars and practitioners confusing
idealized mechanistic models with assumed “real”
mechanisms. Nevertheless, future IS philosophy is
needed to understand MBEs more. Naturalism offers
one alternative. It may be a good alternative, especially

if it turns out that CR, positivism, and interpretivism
cannot do justice to idealizations.
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